CAPITAL MARKET CRASH: THE CASE AGAINST THE BANKS

EFCC Boss

EFCC Boss

When the Director-General of the Securities and Exchange Commission demanded that some banks’ chief executives that had become richer than their banks should be questioned, it was the first formal acknowledgement of the abuses some commercial banks chief executives perpetrated in the Nigerian stock market while the gains and benefits in the market were on the upward swing.

Yet in a report filed by Reuters, a news agency, and published in various national newspapers in August 2007, it had become apparent that there were wary signs of obvious manipulations in the market for the benefits of a few, especially, banking chiefs.

“Investors in Nigeria’s burgeoning stock market are seeing danger signals that the recent rally is turning into a bubble,” the report filed in the third quarter of 2007, had observed .

“Concerns focus on banks, where share price growth has been spectacular since a wave of consolidation in 2005. Most bank stocks have more than doubled in value this year (2007) alone — some have risen by more than 500 per cent — and the majority now trade at more than 20 times their expected 2008 earnings,” the report alerted.

Furthering its alarmed reading of the stock market back in 2007 when it seemed everybody was a winner in the stock market, the Reuter report added:

“Investors say these multiples are unsustainable, even for a fast-growing “pioneer” market like Nigeria, where investor confidence has been growing steadily since economic reforms began in 2003. The report quoted Mr. Jonathan Chew of Imara Asset Management UK Limited which had $25 million invested in Nigerian securities back then as saying that:

“All the indicators of a market going out of control are here, when the entire retail sector is talking about stocks and shares, you know it is getting toppy,”

Reuters had observed then that fears of a bubble in the banking sector have mounted on reports that some banks were engaged in highly leveraged share purchase schemes through stockbrokers. The Reuters 2007 report supported this claim with the opinions of notable operators in the market.

“One senior bank executive said he knew of one case where a capital market operator borrowed six billion naira from a bank to invest in that bank’s shares.” The report asserted while quoting Bismarck Rewane who the report described as a consultant with Financial Derivatives Co. in Lagos who agreed that the practice (highly leveraged share purchase scheme) was widespread.

“Margin trading is the biggest gamble in town right now. It’s very dangerous,” Rewane was reported to have said.

The Reuters report also quoted Godwin Obaseki, managing director of Afrinvest, who said banks have extended big loans to brokers, perhaps as much as 20 per cent of the whole country’s credit.”

Obaseki was, however, quoted in that report to have said he did not know of cases where banks insisted on the loans being used to buy their own shares, which according to him, would be illegal.

More than a year after the report was filed, the Nigerian stock market had unraveled, the suspicion and alarming indicators have been more or less confirmed by the outburst of the SEC’s DG on banks’ high exposure to the stock market, but more than this is the confirmation of the existence of the illegality Obaseki had denied in 2007 about banks granting loans to stock brokers and investors on the condition that they use the facilities to buy their (banks) shares.

Indeed, the practice became a standard in the banking industry especially during the second wave of public offers conducted by listed banks on the Exchange. Industry players talked of how banks provided funds for brokers and other investors to acquire their own shares during public offer. Industry watchers explained that most of the banks resorted to this to make their standing in the capital market look good to the investing public.

Besides, public offers by the implicated banks provided opportunities for bank chief executives and other directors to jostle to take position in the equity of the bank to acquire enough stakes in the bank either to position for influence or to later trade in the equity when price of the stock moved up,” an expert revealed.

“Again, banks also engaged in providing funds to brokers and investors to acquire shares of banks considered choice banks, especially the shares of First Bank Plc, this is one of the reasons the public offer of the bank was over-subscribed by more than 600 per cent, the bank merely wanted to raise N100 billion but it ended up with more than N600billion, money mostly funded towards acquisition of its shares from other commercial banks,” the stock market expert said.

“The idea is that since public offers provide the opportunity to acquire enough shares without the possibility of price moving as a result of demand for the shares outstripping demand as it would happen in the secondary market, funds are routed into the market to acquire as many shares as possible during the public offer with intent at trading in the shares when they are listed for transaction in the secondary market,” the expert further explained.

While the bullish run persisted in the market, the performance of a bank’s stock in the stock market was a measure of the buoyancy of the bank, expert said; this, coupled with the desire of bank’s management to raise cheap funds from the market made many banks to provide funds to willing stock brokers and selected investors to mop their shares in the secondary market. Prices of such banking stocks naturally moved up because of the pressure of the programmed demand on the stocks.

“I can tell you that at a point in time, it seemed as if the only preoccupation of most banks was manipulating the stock market to wring out the last hope of gains. All these contributed to defacing the market and inevitably led to the crash of the Nigerian stock market,” an analyst submitted.

Vice President frustrates Transcorp’s plan to sell off NITEL’s Backbone

The nation’s Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan has, according to sources, stopped moves by the board of directors of Trans National Corporation (Transcorp) to reduce the net worth of Nigeria Telecommunications (NITEL), the national telecommunication carrier in which Transcorp 51 per cent holdings have remained an unending hassle in the Federal Government privatization of former national assets and companies.

The Transnational Corporation of Nigeria secured the purchase of the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited and its mobile arm, Mtel, on Monday, July 03, 2006 for a fee of about $750m.

However, Transcorp paid only $500m of the amount pledged, as it could not come up with the balance of $250m.

The $750m represented the 75 per cent equity holdings that the Federal Government intended to divest from NITEL to the core investor. The remaining 25 per cent was to be sold to Nigerians through a public offer latest in November in 2006. This, however, never happened, as Transcorp could not meet most of the terms of the contracts.

Close to two years after the acquisition of the 51 per cent holding in NITEL, Transcorp was yet to actualize the intentions of the sale of the majority stake in NITEL, the Federal Government under the presidency of Umaru Yar’Adua, successor to the Olusegun Obasanjo’s presidency that superintended the sale of the NITEL shares to Transcorp, in February 2008, reversed the sale of NITEL and its mobile subsidiary, Mobile Telecommunications Limited to Transcorp.

In the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the reversal of sale of NITEL to Transcorp, confusion ensued over the true position of the Federal Government; eventually it was clarified that since Transcorp lacked the requisite technical and financial capacities to manage and successfully rejuvenate NITEL and Mtel, it (Transcorp) and the Federal Government that still holds 49 per cent of the shareholdings would cede 27 per cent and 24 per cent holdings respectively in NITEL to a new core investor.

However, as the nation awaits the announcement of Transcorp successor core investor in NITEL, Transcorp was reported to have floated a special purpose company; the Nigerian Telecommunication Backbone Company Limited. The company was intended to be used to buy out the telecomm-unication backbone of NITEL by way of stripping the telecommunications company’s assets before the cessation of the majority holdings in the company is concluded.

Communications experts explained that success of this sell-off would have put the main operational sphere of NITEL in the purview of this so called Nigeria telecommunication backbone company.

“The company would have inherited NITEL’s main telecommunication platform which may include the SAT 3, the fibre optic and CDMA platforms,” an industry expert said. “These are the platforms that the whole gamut of the Nigerian telecommunication industry still depend on, so if Transcorp arrangement was successful they would, in fact, be transferring a stripped entity to whoever succeeded in the bid to become the new core investor,” the expert reasoned.

Mr. Jonathan, the Vice-President, who is also the Chairman of the National Council on Privatisation, the office on which the ultimate responsibility for the supervision of the privatization processes rests, was reported to have thwarted the move to sell NITEL’s backbone.

“The promoters of the company had successfully persuaded some Nigerians and foreign investors to be part of the Nigerian Telecommunication Backbone company, but when they brought the issue to the attention of the Vice-President he insisted that the status quo must be maintained. This means that nobody is allowed to dispose off any assets or rights that belong to NITEL or Mtel until a new core investor in the company emerges,” a source close to NITEL, confided.

WHEN FIRST REGISTRARS REJECTED FIRST BANK’S CONFIRMATION

But for strident protestation, the management of the Securities and Exchange Commission might have insisted on the January 2009 deadline for the dematerialization of share certificates in Nigeria. Some investors believe this is yet a tall dream for both the SEC and investors especially in consideration of the inadequacy of the Registrars.

Because of lack of appropriate recording system, most registrars have had an automatic recourse to demanding that any investor that wished to dematerialize his or her shares certificate to first go get a bankers confirmation of his/her signature. This attestation, according to the registrars helps ascertain the authenticity of the signature.

The banks had made the confirmation requirement a money making venture, some demand for N5000 for each confirmation. However, an investor informed Fortune&Class Weekly of the shame of the process.

“I have 50,000 units of FirstBank Plc and because of the January 2009 deadline to dematerialize shares certificates I went to my bank which incidentally is FirstBank. After collecting the confirmation, I went to the office of First Registrars where I tendered the banker’s confirmation but I was shocked when officials of First Registrars rejected the banker’s confirmation from FirstBank. Seriously, I am considering writing a protest letter to the Managing Director of FirstBank,” the investor said.

The McKinsey Quarterly Special Feature

Financial crises, past and present

Past financial crises had very different effects on the real economy. Although the lessons of the past don’t give much cause for optimism, they do provide hints on how companies should prepare this time around.

By David Cogman & Richard Dobbs

Financial crises occur with surprising frequency—in every decade in the past century there has been at least one big shock to a major economy’s financial system. Judging from that history, the current upheaval will probably rank among the largest, and we face the prospect of a severe, painful recession. Yet comparing the current financial crisis with those of the 20th century may provide some comfort: the impact of past crises on the real economy was by no means uniform, and it depended, critically, on the way governments acted to recapitalize the banking system and to restore stability and confidence.

The boom that preceded the present crisis uniquely combined several leverage-driven bubbles: a residential-mortgage bubble, an associated one in the real-estate market, and a bubble in corporate earnings. At the time of writing, US financial institutions had taken total credit crisis–related write-offs of almost $1 trillion.1 McKinsey estimates that the total eventual credit losses in the United States are likely to be between $1.7 trillion to $2.2 trillion: at best, a rapid recovery would result in losses of $1.3 trillion; at worst, a protracted recession could see losses as high as $3.1 trillion. In addition, the Bank of England’s estimates suggest losses of around $1.4 trillion from debts in the United Kingdom and the European Union.2 The losses will be greater if another major asset area (such as credit default swaps) collapses or if a misguided policy response exacerbates the problems, as it did in Japan during the 1990s. This range of possible losses represents 10 to 15 percent of US GDP.

By historical standards, that is substantial. In the past century, it was exceeded only three times: during the banking crisis that inaugurated Japan’s “lost decade” in the early 1990s, the Asian financial crisis of the late ’90s, and the Great Depression. In the first two, the afflicted banking systems recorded total losses of 15 and 35 percent3 of GDP, respectively. Losses in the Great Depression were around 20 percent of GDP in 1929, but this occurred in a very different industry environment from today. Due to a combination of runs on deposits, high levels of bank leverage, progressive deleveraging of the economy, and limited ability of the Fed to intervene,4 this quickly became a protracted economic downturn in which more than 9,000 financial institutions either went into bankruptcy or sought governmental assistance, and the economy experienced massive deflation.

From a company standpoint, the critical issue is the impact such shocks and subsequent downturns can have on the availability of credit—and the impact of a credit shortage on the real economy and on consumer and corporate confidence. The downturn after the S&L crisis of the 1980s and ’90s, when bank write-offs equaled some 4 percent of GDP, lasted about two years. GDP ended up about 4 to 5 percent lower than it would have been given the pre-crisis trend line. After the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble, the country’s economy grew by less than half a percent a year in real terms for a decade, and GDP ended up around 18 percent lower than it would have given its pre-crisis trend line. We estimate that the present credit crisis will cut real GDP by around 3 to 7 percent from trend growth. If the US economy were to follow the same path it did in the more severe crises, the total lost GDP could be two to three times greater than that estimate.

But the fallout from the past century’s two worst crises did considerably more damage. In the countries hardest hit by the 1990s’ Asian financial crisis—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand—GDP shrank by an average of 8 percent in 1998 in local-currency terms. Since their currencies halved in value, on average, in US dollar terms the damage was catastrophic—bankrupting many companies and causing widespread social unrest. And during the Great Depression, from 1929 to 1933, 28 percent of real GDP was lost.

As of December 5, 2008, US unemployment stood at 6.7 percent.5 That is slightly above its level during the 2001–02 recession but still some way below the level associated with the oil shocks of the 1970s (8.5 percent) and the S&L crisis (nearly 10 percent). It is far short of unemployment during the Great Depression, which conservative estimates put at around 25 percent.

How long it takes an economy to emerge from a downturn depends heavily on what kind of cleanup and stimulus package governments employ—especially in repairing the banking system’s ability to provide credit efficiently and restoring confidence among companies and consumers. On average, countries have needed two years to emerge from past recessions after banking crises6 and up to twice as long to return to trend growth.7 Only in two cases did a downturn last substantially longer: in Japan during the lost decade, as a result of counterproductive government policies, and in the Great Depression, when the government was far less able to mount a coordinated response than it is today.

Equity markets are the most visible and dramatic indicators as crises unfold. At the end of October 2008, the S&P 500 index had fallen by 46 percent from its peak a year before (October 9, 2007, to October 27, 2008). By late November 2008, the US equity market had given up almost all of its gains since the 2001–02 dot-com bust. Although nobody knows if the market has reached bottom, the fall so far isn’t unusual by historical standards. Japan’s Nikkei 225 fell by 48 percent from peak to trough (December 29, 1989, to October 1, 1990) during the banking crisis, though the market has subsequently fallen still further; at the end of October 2008, it retained less than 20 percent of the peak value reached in 1999. During the Asian financial crisis, the equity markets of Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand fell by 65, 72, and 85 percent, respectively, in local-currency terms. In the United States, the S&P 500 index fell by 49 percent from March 24, 2000, to October 9, 2002, after the tech bubble burst.

There is, however, one important difference in the current crisis. In previous ones, market valuations, as measured by price-to-earnings (P/E), hit excessive levels before the crash.8 This time, corporate earnings, which were around 50 percent above their long-run trend line as a proportion of GDP, experienced a bubble as well. Before the onset of the credit crisis, US corporate earnings were substantially above their trend growth (exhibit).

By historical standards, the real-estate market bubble is more worrisome, because of the medium-term impact on household wealth. From the mid-1970s to the end of the last century, US housing values enjoyed average nominal growth of around 5.4 percent a year, according to the House Price Index of the Office of Federal Housing Oversight. There were two major cycles during this period: in the late 1970s and the late 1980s. In both, national average home prices climbed, at most, 5 to 6 percent above the trend line. From 2000 to 2007, however, home prices climbed to 40 percent above the previous trend.

Going into the present crisis, the US economy was more exposed to real estate than ever before. In the run-up to the S&L crisis, the total stock of US residential property was worth around 104 percent of GDP, and mortgage debt financed a third of that property. In 2001, it was worth around 121 percent of GDP10 and more than 40 percent of it was financed by mortgages. At the end of 2007, Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies estimates, the total stock of US residential property was worth $19 trillion, around 140 percent of US GDP, and more than half was financed by mortgages. If commercial mortgages are included, total mortgage debt was $14.4 trillion, more than 100 percent of GDP.

Since the peak, housing prices have fallen by 18 percent, as measured by the Case–Shiller housing index, whose futures imply a further fall of 19 percent from the peak. Losses in the housing and mortgage markets, when realized, could considerably exceed those in the stock market as of early December 2008.

What does the future hold?

Despite the shared features of the past century’s financial crises—usually, excess leverage somewhere in the financial system and then a breakdown in confidence—the recessions following them were quite different. What determined the length and severity of those recessions was how governments responded: in particular, whether they managed to restore confidence among consumers, companies, investors, and lenders.

An economic crisis becomes a catastrophic recession only if it blocks the provision of capital to businesses long enough to generate widespread corporate failures. This blockage is what made the Asian financial crisis so devastating. Net capital inflows to the region, $93 billion in 1996, turned into net outflows of $12 billion in 1997. Local banking systems just couldn’t provide the capital to plug this gap, foreign banks weren’t prepared to extend credit, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) moved too slowly. As a result, businesses couldn’t finance working capital, let alone investment, and failed to obtain the export financing these countries needed given the high share of exports in their GDPs. Once the flow of credit had been restored, the economies affected by the crisis recovered quickly.

Similar dynamics were at work during the Great Depression, when a combination of bank runs and limited federal controls undermined the financial economy. From 1929 to 1933, almost half of the banks operating in the United States before 1929 failed, as a result of falling prices, the doubling of the country’s debt-service ratio, and the default of more than half of US farm debt.11 Even most of the companies with the strongest credit couldn’t obtain long-term debt capital in the years after the crisis. Moreover, capital had minimal cross-border mobility in the 1930s. With businesses starved of funding, corporate investment fell by more than 75 percent from 1929 to 1933, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.

Under less extreme conditions, with the right kind of government intervention, economies can weather even sizable credit crises. From 1981 to 1983, for example, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) data show that 258 US banks failed or required assistance. Nonetheless, nonresidential US investment fell by less than 1 percent in all. During the entire 1980s, almost 750 banks failed and more than 1,500 required assistance, as opposed to 35 during the preceding decade. Yet corporate investment increased by an average of 4.5 percent a year in the ’80s.

Today, the nonfinancial economy goes into the recession surprisingly well prepared: US industrial companies had lower leverage and higher interest coverage than they did going into the dot-com bust, the S&L crisis, or even the oil shocks of the 1970s. How the real economy fares will depend greatly on the way the current policy debate plays out over the next few quarters.

What should companies do?

We do not yet know how the current crisis will evolve. The confidence of consumers, corporations, and investors—a key factor—cannot be forecast. Nor can government policy. Yet research shows that in past recessions, companies pursuing a purely defensive strategy fared less well than their more active counterparts.12 As the economy enters what will probably be a difficult downturn, companies should prepare to seize their opportunities.

Examine the patterns

Although recessions differ, it’s worth understanding how different industries performed during past downturns and what factors determined the speed of recovery. In coming months, as the focus of government policy shifts from fire fighting to economic stimulus, this kind of research will help companies understand the implications for themselves and assess how the evolving macroenvironment will affect them in the next few years.

Overprepare

Most companies already have contingency plans, but few plan as aggressively as they should. It’s worth preparing for the worst—for example, major customers filing for bankruptcy, capital expenditures neeing to be cut in half quickly, or a country sales operation losing access to local-currency working capital. What seems improbable now could become a reality sooner than you expect.

Scan for opportunities

Managing downside risk shouldn’t blind executives to potential upsides. Despite the current turbulence, in most industries it isn’t hard to identify either the companies that will find themselves under pressure or which consolidation and reshaping scenarios might emerge. Instead of reacting to situations on short notice as they arise, invest time now to understand how such forces might affect your industry and what role you want your company to play.

NIGERIAN ENTERPRENEURS SCARE: GOVERNMENT POLICIES THAT DESTROYED BIG-TIME BUSINESSES

Only the naïve entrepreneur in Nigeria is excited with the contemplation of floating a manufacturing concern. The wise ones, schooled in the experiences they have had to contend with in the ever changing dynamics of manufacturing and other investments tasks in the production lines have fled the scene to the shelter of trading and merchandising. This, for good reasons. The challenges of conducting manufacturing and related production activities in the country, though, besetting, are however benign when compared with the ease with which government oft volte-face on policies and action stamp out the promises or existence of a once upon-a-time manufacturing plant.
In this review, we track some of the celebrated industrial concerns that had been heckled into non-existence by government policy summersaults over the years, official actions or inaction that have become the scare of entrepreneurs.
Presidential Initiative on Cassava Production
In 2002, cassava suddenly gained national prominence following the pronouncement of a Presidential Initiative. The intent of the Initiative was to use cassava as the engine of growth in Nigeria. In the ordinary sense, the perception is that cassava is indigenous to the country, official statistics claim that Nigeria grows more cassava than any other country in the world with a production capacity of about 34 million metric tones a year.
The Presidential Initiative on Cassava production and export was initiated in the year 2002. The goal of the initiative was to promote cassava as a foreign exchange earner in Nigeria as well as to satisfy national demand. The challenge of the initiative was to make Nigeria earn 5 billion US dollars from value added cassava exports by 2007. The objectives of the Presidential Initiative on Cassava was to expand primary processing and utilisation to absorb the national cassava production glut, identify and develop new market opportunities for import substitution and export stimulate increased private sector investment in the establishment of export oriented Cassava industries, ensure the availability of clean (disease free) planting materials targeted at the emerging industries, increase the yield, productivity and expand annual production to achieve global cassava competitiveness, advocate for conducive policy and institutional reforms for the development of the Nigerian cassava sector and integrate the rural poor especially women and youths into the mainstream of the national economy.
The federal government under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo backed the initiative with funding support while encouraging banks and other government and multilateral agencies to drive the initiative through funding support.
Suffice to say that in response to the government drive, an industry revolving around cassava plantation and processing started emerging. Opportunity seekers were encouraged to invest because of the obvious outward flourish of government. The signs were obvious too, under the Presidential Initiative on Cassava, Nigeria mandated millers to integrate 10 percent cassava flour to wheat flour in making bread, a percentage mix of ethanol in refined petroleum motor spirit (petrol) in the nation’s refineries. These were moves aimed at increasing the utilization of the tuber crop.
Other statistics pointed to the profitability of entrepreneurial engagement in cassava related activities; the domestic demand for cassava starch is about 130,000 tonnes per annum and 200,000 tonnes per annum for high quality cassava flour. The domestic demand for ethanol is 180 million litres – all ethanol is imported In Nigeria. None of these markets are being satisfied by local supplier even till today in Nigeria.
Individual entrepreneurs were attracted into the field and the buzz made the rounds of great things happening in cassava production in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the fancy was just for a time, even before the exit of the Obasanjo’s regime, there were obvious signs of government distancing itself from the clarion call to cassava farming and processing, soon after the assumption of office of President Umar Musa Yar’Adua, immediate successor to Obasanjo, federal government articulation of the cassava initiative lost its din.
The lacklustre enforcement of the policy of mandating flour millers to integrate 10 percent cassava flour to wheat flour in making bread and other confectionaries were altogether abandoned. Of course, the idealism of the refinery blend of ethanol with petrol had been a mirage according to entrepreneurs that had found their ways into cassava processing. “The nation’s refineries only functioned epileptically, rather, the bulk of refined products are being imported from foreign refineries, so the idea of the ethanol could not have worked out at all.” A cassava processor said
The government of Yar’Adua nailed the fledgling sector by abandoning the ethos of the Obasanjo initiated presidential initiative on cassava initiative. Importations of cassava processed by products and all have been allowed in the country with import tariff of 20 percent value.
“Apparently, this has sounded the death knell for that endeavour.” Another cassava processor said. “Local conditions have made it difficult to produce and process cassava, the thinking was to protect the industry until such a time that it would be able to compete favourably with importation but I understand that government decided to make this reversal because of the need to mitigate increased food prices. But then, we think that it would have been better to strengthen cassava production and processing in the country to boost food supply and to earn more income for government through export.
In the final analysis, the fact is that most entrepreneurs have had their investment and efforts gone up in smoke, another promise subverted by inconsistent government policy shift.
NIGERIAN LAMP PLC
One of the outstanding business endeveavour the recently demised Chief Beyioku Adebowlale of the Adebowale Store fame would be remembered for is his Nigerian Lamp Industry Plc. A courageous indigenous effort to play in the main stream manufacturing sector, when Adebowale built the Nigerian Lamp plant in his native Epe in Lagos State, it was reported to be the first of its kind in Africa. The plant was equipped to manufacture light bulbs and fluorescent.
It is reported that Adebowale was encouraged to make a foray into the manufacturing effort away from his electronic products trading concern in the Adebowale Electronic Store by the positive outlook of government incentive for indigenous manufacturers to commit to the economy in the 1980s.
Unfortunately, by the time the plant came on stream, it was like hitting dirt on first day of commission, government had made a reversal on policy, rather than protect local industries, government lifted the restricted importation of bulbs and fluorescents tube and other lamp forms. The market place was immediately flooded with Asian and Far East Asian countries bulb brands, which were cheaper though low in quality.
Nigerian Lamp, unfortunately, had become a publicly quoted company, Nigerians had subscribed to is initial public offer, but with the influx of cheaper products and brands into the market, the company’s operation became blighted and soon after became literally comatose. The company that never took off for operation eventually was placed under a receiver manager. This officially announced the demise of the once upon a Time promising company.
ROKANA INDUSTRIES PLC
Rokana Industries, had, back in the late 1980s caught the attention of the dentistry world with its production of the uniquely styled Jordan tooth brush. The market penetration of the Rokana brand of tooth brush was fast and quite domineering. It is reported that in its first year of introduction, the Rokana brand had pushed other imported brands to the back of the shelves. Jodan tooth brush was, considered the authentic Nigerian brand though the brand is a British franchise.
The dominance of the brand won’t endure for long however, because the Federal Government felt no need to specifically outlaw the activities of importers who would rather import fake Jordan tooth brush into Nigeria than to import other brands.
This more or less killed the vibrancy of the brand in the market place, it is however to the credit of the endearing qualities of the brand that it still subsists till day despite the continuous import of its counterfeit. The limitation is that Rokana, the producing company which is also a publicly quoted company floated by the immediate past commerce minister in the Yar’Adua’s cabinet Mr. Charles Ugwuh, has remained more or less moribund on the stock exchange’s price listing as investors ignored it even when the stock market was upbeat.
DOYIN INDUSTRIES
Doyin Industries is still a flourishing concern, this would not have been so if the man behind the manufacturing concern had not been well grounded in the ways of manufacturing in Nigeria. Of course he had been badly burnt from his engagement with manufacturing.
Samuel Adedoyin, the man behind Doyin Industries started out in business as a trader and he made quite a success of it that he diversified into manufacturing of household and food items and body care products. By 1996 he mobilized credit to build an awesome factory to manufacture his company’s range of products, and he was daring enough to take on multi-national companies. Travails soon ensued, electricity limitation to power the factory and the credit sourcing for funding the factory project became a burden, the market was also flooded with cheaper products from Asian countries.
The operations of the company soon became hamstrung, credit issues from City Express Bank became a public embarrassment for the Kwara State born industrialist, eventually, a production line of the industry had to close down and workers lay off.
DUNLOP
Dunlop Nigeria Plc is the latest of once buoyant companies to hit the dirt. The company had endured the harsh economic environment and had over the years returned impressive earnings to investors in the company being a public quoted company a greater majority of 95 per cent of the company’s shares belongs to several state governments, public companies and no fewer than 93,000 private Nigerians.
In 1991, it acquired majority shareholding in PAMOL (Nigeria) Limited, a rubber producing company to ensure uninterrupted supply of the right quality natural rubber, a major raw material in tyre manufacturing.
The company pioneered the radial car tubeless tyres in West Africa; produced the first crossply tyre in tubeless in Nigerian market; was the first Nigerian tyre company to hold the E.C.E 30 Certificate, an export requirement for car tyres to Europe; and first manufacturing company in Africa (beside South Africa) to hold the ISO 9002 certification.
It would soon be revealed during the former minister of commerce visit to Dunlop factory late last year that the company was merely struggling to stay afloat. The managing director of the company had complained about infrastructural deficiency, especially energy (electricity and recently, gas outages) and import duty regimes, inconsistent tax regimes which combine to place local manufacturers at significant disadvantage.
A major gripe of the company was its N8 billion expansion into the Heavy Truck Radial segment which was frustrated by reversal of government policy on tariff for imported truck/bus tyres from 40 per cent to 10 per cent at the beginning of 2007. This according to the company’s officials, created unfair and inequitable advantages for importers of finished tyres.
The dichotomy between tariff for car tyres (50 per cent) and Truck/Bus tyres (10 per cent) is said to have been abused by importers, both in terms of tariff and haulage evasion.
The situation confers undue advantages on importation rather than local manufacturing, now, the company has declared its incapacity to continue manufacturing activities in the country. Unofficial source said it would resort to tyre importation with grave implications for the rubber from its subsidiary, Pamol.
FAMAD (FORMERLY BATA) PLC and LENNARDS NIGERIA PLC
Before the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme, Bata’s ubiquitous outlets were the ultimate in foot wear shopping for all ages, Bata with its lesser cousin, Lennards Nigeria Plc. After 1986, the promise of flourishing was effectively shut out of the footwear manufacturing outfits. Government could not stem smuggling activities.
Synthetic shoes from Dubai and other Asian countries and high quality leather foot wear from Europe smuggled large scale into Nigeria particularly suffocated indigenous production. Ironically, the nation’s export in their raw forms the materials needed for footwear manufacturing. The products are exported, refined, recycled and packaged abroad to be sent back to Nigeria as import.
Till date, no appropriate government policy has addressed the inadequacy in the sector that has turned FAMAD (BATA) and LENNARDS into moribund companies.
VOLKSWAGEN AND PAN NIGERIA
In the 1970s Nigerian was the centre of attraction in the African continent with its hosting of the Volkswagen and Peugeot Automobile Nigeria plants. Nigerians, before the economic deluge of the last quarter of 1986 were sure of brand new cars proudly assembled in Nigeria. The assembly plants were supposed to be transitional in the nation’s march to becoming a full fledged vehicle manufacturing country.
The dream was cut short by government policy. Government steel rolling mills could not produce an ounce to support the desire to attain full production capacity, just as the value of the naira had suddenly depreciated in the years running to the close of the 1980 decade, and government back in the days, unofficially gave the go ahead for the importation of second hand vehicle (Tokunbo) at outrageously low tariff without consideration for age of vehicle to be imported.